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Abstract
We consider an infinite sequence consisting of agents of several types and goods of several types, with a bipartite
compatibility graph between agent and good types. Goods are matched with agents that appear earlier in the sequence
using FCFS matching, if such are available, and are lost otherwise. This model may be used for two sided queueing
applications such as ride sharing, web purchases, organ transplants, and for abandon at completion redundancy parallel
service queues. For this model we calculate matching rates and delays. These can be used to obtain waiting times
and help with design questions for related service systems. We explore some relations of this model to other FCFS
stochastic matching models.
Keywords: Dynamic online matching ; FCFS matching ; matching rates ; matching delays ; two sided queues ;
parallel service systems.
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1 Introduction
Classical queueing models have random streams of customer arrivals and fixed sets of servers. Recently however,
more and more applications are better modeled by two sided queues, where the fixed sets of servers are replaced by
streams of arriving servers. The simplest example of such a system is the taxi stand, where cabs and passengers arrive at
random times, and depart at the moment that they meet. More general systems where two sided models seem appropriate
include ride sharing systems, organ transplants, web postings and searches, job markets, trading and auctions. These
models share a more symmetric role of the so called customers and servers, and in particular, in these models service
durations are replaced by inter-arrival times. In the simplest taxi stand model, the symmetric version where both cabs
and passengers can wait, is always either transient or null-recurrent, and to be useful the model needs to include finite
waiting rooms or abandonments. In particular one may assume that cabs always wait, while passengers abandon and
are lost if they do not find a cab at the stand. This seems also to be the model appropriate for ride sharing systems like
Uber and Lyft, for Transplants of perishable organs or blood transfusions, and for internet purchasing. Our results in
this paper are relevant for the following two sided parallel service model: Agents of several types arrive to the system
and wait for goods, and goods of several types arrive and match and depart with a compatible agent, or, if no match is
immediately available for an arriving good, it is lost. Compatibility is determined by a bipartite graph. The system is
controlled by a matching policy – which of the available compatible agents is assigned the arriving good. In this paper
we focus on the first come first served (FCFS) policy: The arriving good is assigned to the longest waiting compatible
agent. We do not however study this system directly, instead we consider the following discrete time matching model.
We consider a matching system in which agents of several types, indexed by ci ∈ C = {c1, . . . ,cI} are matched
with several types of goods, indexed by s j ∈S = {s1, . . . ,sJ}, subject to a bipartite compatibility graph G , such that
(s j,ci) ∈ G if agent type ci is compatible with good type s j. We assume an infinite sequence of agents and goods, which
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is chosen i.i.d. from C ∪S . Matching is done on a first come first served basis (FCFS), where goods are only matched
to agents that appear earlier in the sequence, and goods that find no compatible match are lost. We call this a directed
matching model, to distinguish it from a model where goods are not lost, and can be matched to agents that appear later
in the sequence. This model is an exact discrete time analog of the two sided parallel service system if arrivals of agents
and goods form independent Poisson processes. Moreover, this discrete model has the advantage that it captures the
essentials of more general systems, where arrivals are any generally distributed and time dependent processes, as long
as types of successive arrivals are i.i.d. Data for this more abstract model is very compact, it consists of the compatibility
graph and the frequencies of the types.
This model was introduced in [2] where the following results were derived:
- The matching is stable if and only if there are enough compatible goods for every subset of agent types (see Definition
2).
- Under stability there is almost surely a unique matching for the bi-infinite sequence of agents and goods (see Unique-
ness Theorem 2).
- Exchanging the positions of each matched pair in the bi-infinite sequence results in an i.i.d sequence, in which the
same matches are now directed FCFS in reversed time (see Reversibility Theorem 3).
- The stationary distribution of unmatched agents at every stage along the sequence is derived up to a normalizing
constant (see Product Form Theorem 1).
Several questions were left unanswered in [2] and motivate the current paper, our main results are:
- We find a detailed Markov description of the matching process, obtain its stationary distribution which is of a very
simple intuitive form, and find a simple characterization of the possible states (see Section 3)
- We calculate the normalizing constant which was not obtained in [2] (see Section 4).
- We calculate the matching rates i.e. long range frequencies of (s j,ci) ∈ G matches, and the fraction of unmatched
goods of each type (see Section 5)
- We obtain the distributions of delays, i.e. the distances between matched agent and good pairs, and derive explicit
expressions for their generating functions and first and second moments (see Section 6).
- We show that in heavy traffic, the directed bipartite matching model converges in a certain sense to the symmetric
bipartite matching model of [7, 3, 1, 11] (see Section 7).
Before outlining our results we discuss some related literature: The idea of studying parallel service systems by
looking at FCFS matching of an infinite discrete sequence of customers (agents) and an infinite discrete sequence of
servers (goods) was first suggested in [7], motivated by a public housing allocation application [10]. In this bipartite
matching formulation customers and servers play completely symmetric roles. Several examples, with simple compati-
bility graphs were analyzed in this paper. A necessary and sufficient condition for stability and a product form stationary
distribution for the symmetric bipartite matching model were derived in [3]. The product form stationary distribution
was derived by partial balance, similar to [12, 4]. Most important, the stationary distribution was then used to derive ex-
pressions for the matching rates, i.e. the fraction of customers of each type served by each type of server (see Definition
4 Section 5). These were considered quite intractable and are essential in studying the performance of FCFS parallel
service systems. A deeper analysis of the symmetric bipartite matching model followed in [1], where three theoretical
results were derived: A uniqueness result analogous to Theorem 2, a reversibility result analogous to Theorem 3, and
detailed Markov descriptions of the matching process, with simple multi-Bernoulli stationary distributions, similar to
Theorem 4 derived in this paper. In addition to the matching rates, another important performance measure was derived,
the distributions of link lags, i.e. the lags between matched customer server pairs (compare to Section 6 here).
In a recent paper by Moyal, Busic and Mairesse [11], a matching model for a general undirected graph is formulated
and analyzed: there is a single sequence of items of several types, and a general compatibility graph, and each item in the
sequence is matched to an earlier compatible item if such exists, or it remains unmatched until it can be matched to a later
item in the sequence. For i.i.d. types, under FCFS matching they derive a condition for stability, they prove a uniqueness
result and a reversibility result analogous to Theorems 2 and 3, and derive stationary product form distributions, up to
a normalizing constant. In the current version of the paper there is no calculation of the normalizing constant, or of the
matching rates. Moyal et al. [11] also note that if the compatibility graph is a bipartite graph, then the condition for
stability is always violated. We explain this in Section 7.
Several papers that consider parallel service systems with customers and servers of several types and bipartite com-
patibility graph are closely related to matching models. The stationary distribution of the parallel service system with
Poisson arrivals and exponential service times, derived in [4] converges to the bipartite matching model of [3] is heavy
traffic. In [9] Gardner et. al. introduce another kind of FCFS policy, called a redundancy policy: each server maintains
its own FCFS queue, and customers make independent copies of their job, and join the queues of all the compatible
2
servers, so that they may be served simultaneously by more than one server. The customer then departs when his service
at the first of the compatible servers is complete. This is also called cancel-on-complete in [6], to distinguish it from
the model of [4] which is referred to as cancel-on-start. If service times are exponential, then simultaneous service until
first completion incurs no loss, and with Poisson arrivals the distribution of the queue lengths is shown to be of product
form. Kleiner et al. [2] compare the policies of [4] and [9] and discuss their relations to our FCFS directed bipartite
matching model. Surprisingly Kleiner [2] finds that the stationary Markov chain that describes the redundancy service
system is the same as the one describing the unmatched agents in our model. Further research on this type of model is
surveyed in [8].
In [5] a heuristic based on calculation of matching rates for the symmetric FCFS bipartite matching model is used
in the design of parallel service systems under many server scaling. A similar design heuristic based on the calculations
of matching rates for the directed FCFS matching model may be useful for design of two sided systems such as ride
sharing etc.
We now briefly describe the results in the following sections. In Section 2 we define the directed FCFS bipartite
matching model and summarize the results of [2], which form the basis for our analysis in this paper. We name this
model a directed FCFS matching model to distinguish it from the symmetric FCFS matching model of [7, 3, 1]: in the
symmetric model goods can be matched both to earlier and to later agents, while in the current model goods do not wait,
and can only be matched to agents in the past direction.
In Section 3 we consider the following detailed Markov chain that describes the evolution of the directed FCFS
matching: We perform matching of all goods up to time N (i.e. position N in the sequence), and with each match we
exchange the positions of the matched agent and good. We then define the state as the list of items in the sequence,
starting with the first unmatched agent, and ending at the Nth item. The list includes unmatched agents, unmatched and
lost gods, and matched and exchanged agents and goods. We show in Theorem 4 that the probability of such a list is
simply the product of the frequencies of the items, multiplied by a normalizing constant. This simplicity is deceptive,
since it hides dependence on the constraints of what states are actually admissible (i.e. states that occur with positive
probability). We next obtain a simple characterization of admissible states in Theorem 5. The results in this section are
analogous to similar results in [1] and [11].
In Section 4 we consider a more concise Markov chain associated our model. We again consider making all the
matches up to a discrete time N, and list the agents that remain unmatched. The list of these unmatched agents up to N
is a Markov chain and its stationary product form distribution was given in [2], following the derivation in [9]. A more
concise Markov chain includes just the identities of which types appear in the list of unmatched agents, in their order of
appearance in the list, and the count of how many additional unmatched agents are between them. This is also a Markov
chain, and we derive its stationary distribution in Theorem 6. We use this more tractable Markov chain to calculate the
normalizing constant, which is also the normalizing constant for the detailed process and the process of [2].
In Section 5 we derive expressions for the matching rates (Definition 4), i.e. the long range fraction of matches for
each pair s j,ci ∈ G , and the fraction of goods of each type that remain unmatched. It is conjectured that the calculation
of the matching rates (as well as the normalizing constant) is ]P. Nevertheless, the calculation is straight forward, and
we list an algorithm to perform it.
In Section 6 we derive the distribution of delays, i.e. for each s j,ci ∈ G , the distance in the sequence between the
agent and the matched good. We find that these distributions are a mixture of convolutions of independent geometric
random variables. We obtain explicit expressions for the generating functions and for the mean and variance of these
delays. We list an enhancement to the algorithm of Section 5 to calculate these means and variances. These can be used
to obtain waiting times in the corresponding queueing models.
In Section 7 we show that in heavy traffic the directed FCFS bipartite matching model converges to the symmetric
matching model of [7, 3, 1]. We also obtain the limiting matching rates in light traffic.
In Section 8 we illustrate our results for a simple example. We demonstrate the advantage of pooling service by
bipartite matching over discriminating service.
2 The Model and Previous Results
We consider a single infinite sequence of agents and goods, which is generated as follows: each successive item in
the list is an agent with probability λ¯λ¯+µ¯ , or a good with probability
µ¯
λ¯+µ¯ . If it is an agent its type is ci with probability
αci , and if it is a good, its type is s j with probability βs j , so that in summary, the elements of the sequence are i.i.d.
3
(zn)n=...,−2,−1,0,1,2,..., and
P(zn = ci) =
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
αci =
λci
λ¯ + µ¯
, P(zn = s j) =
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βs j =
µs j
λ¯ + µ¯
, ci ∈ C , s j ∈S , n ∈ Z. (1)
where λci , µs j are as defined above, and G is the bipartite compatibility graph. We define the matching as follows:
Definition 1 (Directed FCFS matching). We say that agents and goods are matched according to directed FCFS match-
ing if the following holds: zn = s j is matched with zm = ci if and only if:
(i) n> m,
(ii) (s j,ci) ∈ G ,
(iii) For all k < m such that zk = ci′ and (z j,ci′) ∈ G , there exists zl with l < n, such that zl is matched with zk.
If zn = s j has no match that satisfies these conditions then zn remains unmatched.
This matching model was introduced in [2], and the following definitions and three theorems are quoted from that
paper.
Notation We letS (ci) denote the subset of good types compatible with ci, and C (s j) denote the subset of agent types
compatible with s j. For C ⊂ C , S⊂S we letS (C) =⋃ci∈CS (ci), C (S) =⋃s j∈SC (s j), and denote by U (S) = C (S)
those agent types that are compatible only with good types in S. We also let αC = ∑ci∈Cαci , βS = ∑s j∈S βs j and λC =
∑ci∈C λci , µS = ∑s j∈S µs j .
Definition 2 (Stability condition). We say that the stability condition holds if for all C⊆ C , S⊆S the following holds:
λC < µS (C) (2)
The following Markov chain was defined in [2]: Assume all the possible directed FCFS matches of goods up to zN
have been made. Define X(N) as the ordered sequence c1, . . . ,cL, such that cl = znl , n1 < · · · < nL ≤ N are the only
unmatched agents remaining, ordered as in the sequence.
The states of this Markov chain are described by finite sequences of agent types. This is a countable state Markov
chain (the set of finite sequences of agent types is a countable set, even if the set of types is infinite). Its transition
probabilities are:
P(X(N+1) = c1, . . . ,cL|X(N) = c1, . . . ,cL) =
µS ({c1,...,cL})
λ¯ + µ¯
,
P(X(N+1) = c1, . . . ,cL,cL+1|X(N) = c1, . . . ,cL) = λcL+1
λ¯ + µ¯
, (3)
P(X(N+1) = c1, . . . ,ci−1,ci+1, . . . ,cL|X(N) = c1, . . . ,cL) =
µS ({c1,...,ci−1})∩S (ci)
λ¯ + µ¯
,
It turns out that this Markov chain is the jump chain of the redundancy service model studied by [9], where the
following is proved.
Theorem 1 (Product Form Theorem). The Markov chain X(N) is ergodic if and only if the stability condition (2) holds.
Its stationary distribution is given, up to a normalizing constant, by:
piX (c1, . . . ,cL) ∝
L
∏`
=1
λc`
µS ({c1,...,c`})
. (4)
It is clear that for any sequence z0,z1, . . . , the directed FCFS matching is unique. The corresponding Markov chain
is X(N), N = 0,1, . . . starting from no unmatched agents, i.e. X(0) = /0. However, If we prepend to the sequence for
n = 0,1, . . . a z−1 and look at the directed FCFS matching for z−1,z0,z1, . . . we usually will get a different matching,
i.e. the process starting from X(−1) = /0 will be different from that starting with X(0) = /0. The following somewhat
surprising theorem is similar to one proved for the undirected FCFS matching of a sequence of agents to an independent
sequence of goods in [1].
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Theorem 2 (Uniqueness Theorem). Let . . . ,z−1,z0,z1, . . . be a sequence of agent and good types chosen i.i.d. as above.
If the stability condition (2) holds then almost surely there exists a directed FCFS matching of goods to cover all the
agents, and this matching is unique.
The proof is given in [2]. The main steps are to show forward coupling, then to show backward coupling, and then
to conclude that a Loynes construction will yield the unique matching almost surely. A similar uniqueness result is also
proved in [11].
For the next result, which is also analogous to a similar result in [1], and is proven in [2], we define the following
exchange transformation:
Definition 3 (Exchange Transformation). For the directed FCFS matching, after all possible matches were made on
. . . ,z−1,z0,z1, . . ., we define the exchanged sequence . . . , z˜−1, z˜0, z˜1, . . . as follows: If zm = ci was matched to zn = s j,
where m < n, then in the exchanged sequence we will have z˜m = s j, z˜n = ci. If zn = s j was unmatched, then z˜n = zn.
Throughout the paper we use c˜, s˜ to denote items that were matched and exchanged.
As a consequence of the stability and the unique matching over Z, we obtain:
Theorem 3 (Reversiblity Theorem). Assume the stability condition (2) holds. The sequence . . . , z˜−1, z˜0, z˜1, . . . obtained
from the sequence . . . ,z−1,z0,z1, . . . by the exchange transformation is an i.i.d. sequence. The unique directed matches
for the new sequence performed in reversed time, result in exactly the reversed matches of the original sequence, almost
surely.
3 Detailed Markov Chains with Multi-Bernoulli Stationary Distributions
We now define two additional Markov chains associated with the directed FCFS infinite bipartite matching model.
These processes describe the evolution of matching and exchanging items in the sequence (zn)−∞<n<∞. We define
detailed goods matching process U(N), to describe matching and exchanging all goods up to (and including) N with
agents that appear earlier in the sequence (with some goods left unmatched). We define the detailed agents matching
process W (N), to describe matching and exchanging all agents up to (and including) N with goods that appear later in
the sequence. For U(N) we perform directed FCFS matches and exchanges of all compatible pairs zm = ci,zn = s j, m<
n≤N, while for W (N) we perform directed FCFS matches and exchanges of all compatible pairs zm = ci,zn = s j, m< n,
for all agents m≤ N, including some zn = s j for which n> N.
Specifically, U(N) is defined as follows: if X(N) = /0, i.e. all agents appearing up to N have been matched to goods
appearing up to N, then U(N) = /0. Otherwise, let N be the location in the sequence of the first unmatched agent, then
U(N) = u = (u1, . . . ,uL) where L = N −N + 1, and U(N) records the elements in the sequence from N to N, after
matching and exchanging of goods to earlier agents, and also exchanging the remaining unmatched goods up to N with
themselves. The elements of u are then of types ci or c˜i or s˜ j and are constructed as follows:
- u1 = ci where ci = zN is the type of the first unmatched agent,
- ul = ci′ if zN+l−1 = ci′ is unmatched,
- ul = s˜ j if zN+l−1 = s j remains unmatched (it is exchanged with itself),
- ul = c˜i′′ if zN+l−1 has originally been a good, and has been matched and exchanged with an agent of type ci′′ that
appeared earlier in the sequence,
- ul = s˜ j′ if zN+l−1 has originally been an agent, and has been matched and exchanged with a good of type s j′ that has
appeared later in the sequence, in a position ≤ N.
Similarly, W (N) is defined as follows: if X(N) = /0, i.e. all agents appearing up to N have been matched to goods
appearing up to N, then W (N) = /0. Otherwise, let N be the location in the sequence of the last matched and exchanged
good (we have N > N since X(N) 6= /0), then W (N) = w = (w1, . . . ,wK) where K = N −N, and W (N) records the
elements in the sequence from N + 1 to N, after matching and exchanging of agents from locations up to N with later
goods. The elements of w are of types ci or c˜i or s j and are constructed as follows:
- wK = c˜i where zN+K has been a good that has been matched and exchanged with an agent of type ci that appeared in
the sequence in a position ≤ N
- wl = ci′ if ci′ = zN+l is as yet unmatched, because only agents up to N have been matched.
- wl = s j if s j = zN+l has not been matched to an agent appearing up to N,
- wl = c˜i′ if zN+l has originally been a good, and has been matched and exchanged with an agent of type ci′ that appeared
in the sequence in position ≤ N
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We now use the reversibility theorem. By the reversibility Theorem 3 under the condition (2), almost surely, if we
take the sequence (zn)−∞<n<∞ and do all the directed FCFS matches and exchanges we obtain the sequence (z˜n)−∞<n<∞
which is again i.i.d. and if we do directed FCFS matches and exchanges in reversed time on the sequence (z˜n)−∞<n<∞
we will retrieve the original sequence (zn)−∞<n<∞. In fact, the pairs that are matched are the same in both sequences.
We consider the sequence (z˜n)−∞<n<∞, and define goods and agents detailed matching processes for it in reversed
time: U˜(N + 1), W˜ (N + 1) are obtained when we do matching for the sequence (z˜n)−∞<n<∞, where for U˜(N + 1)
we perform directed FCFS matches and exchanges in reversed time, of pairs z˜n = s˜ j, z˜m = c˜i,m > n, for all goods
in positions n > N, while for W˜ (N + 1) we perform directed FCFS matches and exchanges in reversed time of pairs
z˜n = s˜ j, z˜m = c˜i,m> n, for all agents in positions m> N.
For any vector u consisting of items c, c˜,s, s˜ we denote by u˜ the exchanged vector in which we exchange between c, c˜
and between s, s˜. We denote by←−u the reversed vector which is u written in reversed order. We will also use the notation←−˜
u for exchanging and reversing.
Proposition 1. For almost all (zn)−∞<n<∞ and corresponding (z˜n)−∞<n<∞, and for −∞< N < ∞ we have:
If
U(N) = u = (u1, . . . ,uL)
U(N+1) = u′ = (u′1, . . . ,u′L
′
)
then W˜ (N+2) =
←−u ′ = (u′L′ , . . . ,u′1),
W˜ (N+1) =←−u = (uL, . . . ,u1). (5)
and similarly,
If
W (N) = w = (w1, . . . ,wK)
W (N+1) = w′ = (w′1, . . . ,w′K
′
)
then U˜(N+2) =
←−w ′ = (w′K′ , . . . ,w′1),
U˜(N+1) =←−w = (wK , . . . ,w1). (6)
Proof. By definition, U(N) will have all goods in the sequence zn up to N matched and exchanged, and will list the
resulting items from N to N, while all items in positions > N are still unmatched and not exchanged. On the other hand,
W˜ (N+1) will have all the agents in the exchanged sequence z˜n from N+1 to ∞ matched and exchanged back to their
values in zn, and list the items from N to N in reversed order. In particular, the first item in U(N) is the earliest unmatched
agent zN = ci, and it could only be matched later with zm = s j which is in position m> N, while in W˜ (N+1) z˜m = c˜i is
matched and exchanged back with z˜N = s˜ j. Similarly any unmatched agent zn = ci, n< N in U(N) has a match zm with
m > N, hence z˜n = s˜ j, and z˜m = c˜i, and in W˜ (N + 1) they will be matched and exchanged back. All other elements of
U(N) are exchanged c˜ or z˜ which are in their original positions in W˜ (N + 1). Hence W˜ (N + 1) lists the same items as
U(N) in reversed order. By exactly the same argument, W˜ (N + 2) lists the same items as U(N + 1) in reversed order.
The statement (6) can be proved similarly, and in fact it follows directly from the reversibility Theorem 3.
Proposition 2. For the stationary versions of the detailed Markov process U(N) the reversed transition probabilities
are given by:
P
(
U(N+1) = u′
)
P
(
U(N) = u|U(N+1) = u′)
= P
(
W (N) =
←−˜
u′
)
P
(
W (N+1) =
←−˜
u |W (N) =←−˜u′ ). (7)
Proof.
P
(
U(N+1) = u′
)
P
(
U(N) = u|U(N+1) = u′)
= P
(
U(N) = u ,U(N+1) = u′
)
= P
(
W˜ (N+1) =←−u , W˜ (N+2) =←−u ′)
= P
(
W˜ (N+2) =←−u ′)P(W˜ (N+1) =←−u |W˜ (N+2) =←−u ′)
= P
(
W (N) =
←−˜
u
′)
P
(
W (N+1) =
←−˜
u |W (N) =←−˜u ′).
(8)
The first and third equalities are by definition of conditional probability. The second equality holds for the stationary
processes by Proposition 1, equation (5). The last equality follows from the reversibility Theorem 3, since the Markov
chain W (N) driven by the sequence zn has the same stationary distribution and the same transition probabilities as the
Markov chain W˜ (N) driven by the sequence z˜n in reversed time.
Theorem 4 (Multi-Bernoulli Form). If the stability conditions (2) holds, then the stationary distribution of the detailed
Markov chains is given by:
piU (u1, . . . ,uL) = piW (u1, . . . ,uL)
= B
(
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)]agents( µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)]goods
∏
ci∈C
α]ci+]c˜ici ∏
s j∈S
β ]s j+]s˜ js j ,
(9)
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where B is the normalizing constant given by (14), and we are counting the number of agents and of goods overall, and
of each type separately, in u1, . . . ,uL.
Proof. That piU (u1, . . . ,uL) = piW (u1, . . . ,uL) follows from Proposition 1. By definition piU ( /0) = piW ( /0) = piX ( /0). We
will show that piX ( /0) = B and show that B is given by (14) in Section 4. It remains to prove (9) for piU . For a stationary
Markov chain this is equivalent to verifying that:
piU (u)P
(
U(N+1) = u′|U(N) = u)= piU (u′)P(U(N) = u|U(N+1) = u′). (10)
We have found in Proposition 2 that the reversed transition probabilities for U are given by transition probabilities of
W . Also, we note that in the form of equation (9), piU (u) = piU (←−u ) = piU (u˜) = piU (←−˜u ), with similar equalities for W .
Therefore to prove (10) we will verify that the expressions in (9) satisfy:
piU (u′)
piU (u)
=
P
(
U(N+1) = u′|U(N) = u)
P
(
W (N+1) =
←−˜
u |W (N) =←−˜u′ ) . (11)
and to do so we need to calculate transition probabilities for U and for W from N to N+1. These transition probabilities
hinge on the identity of x = zN+1 and the corresponding x˜ = z˜N+1. We start from U(N) = u = (u1, . . . ,uL). There are
four cases:
Case (i): x = ci
If U(N) = u = (u1, . . . ,uL) and zN+1 = ci, then U(N + 1) = u′ = (u1, . . . ,uL,ci). The probability of the transition
u→ u′ is λ¯λ¯+µ¯αci .
In that case W (N) =
←−˜
u′ = (c˜i, u˜L, . . . , u˜1). This means that the zN+1 has already been matched and exchanged, and
is now z˜N+1 = x˜ = c˜i. Therefore all agents up to N + 1 have been matched, and W (N + 1) =
←−˜
u = (u˜L, . . . , u˜1). The
probability of the transition:
←−˜
u′ →←−˜u is 1.
We now check:
piU (u1, . . . ,uL,ci)
piU (u1, . . . ,uL)
=
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
αci ,
P
(
U(N+1) = (u1, . . . ,uL,ci) |U(N) = (u1, . . . ,uL)
)
P
(
W (N+1) = (u˜L, . . . , u˜1) |W (N) = (c˜i, u˜L, . . . , u˜1)
) = λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
αci .
Case (ii): x = s j, and s j is incompatible with the unmatched agents in (u1, . . . ,uL)
If U(N) = u = (u1, . . . ,uL) and zN+1 = s j and s j is incompatible with any of the unmatched agents in (u1, . . . ,uL),
then s j remains unmatched and is replaced by s˜ j (matched with itself), so that U(N + 1) = u′ = (u1, . . . ,uL, s˜ j). The
probability of the transition u→ u′ is µ¯λ¯+µ¯ β s j.
In that case W (N) =
←−˜
u′ = (s j, u˜L, . . . , u˜1). This means that the N+1 element is zN+1 = s j. Since all agents prior to
N have been matched, s j will remain unmatched, and in the transition from W (N) to W (N+1) there will be no change
in u˜L, . . . , u˜1), and so W (N+1) = u˜L, . . . , u˜1) =
←−˜
u . The probability of this transition is again 1.
We now check:
piU (u1, . . . ,uL, s˜ j)
piU (u1, . . . ,uL)
=
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βs j ,
P
(
U(N+1) = (u1, . . . ,uL, s˜ j) |U(N) = (u1, . . . ,uL)
)
P
(
W (N+1) = (u˜L, . . . , u˜1) |W (N) = (s j, u˜L, . . . , u˜1)
) = µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βs j .
Case (iii): x = s j, which is matched FCFS with ul = ci, where l > 1
If U(N) = u = (u1, . . . ,uL) and zN+1 = s j and s j is compatible with ul = ci, and is incompatible with all unmatched
agents among u1, . . . ,ul−1, then s j is matched and exchanged with ul , so: U(N+1)= u′=(u1, . . . ,ul−1, s˜ j,ul+1, . . . ,uL, c˜i).
The probability of this transition u→ u′ is µ¯λ¯+µ¯ β s j.
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In that case W (N) =
←−˜
u′ = (ci, u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1,s j, u˜l−1. . . . , u˜1). Because zN+1 = ci, it needs to be matched and exchanged
in the transition from W (N) to W (N+1). Clearly it can be matched and exchanged with s j which is between u˜l+1, u˜l−1.
We claim that ci cannot be matched to any of u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1. Recall that it was left unmatched in U(N). Assume some
l+ 1 ≤ k ≤ L, u˜k = s j′ is compatible with ci. in that case, uk = s˜ j′ and there are two possibilities: either zN+k−1 = s j′
could not be matched, and was exchanged to s˜ j′ , or zN+k−1 = ci′ that was matched and exchanged with s j′ that appeared
later in the sequnce but before N+1. But in either of these cases s j′ should then have been matched and exchanged with
zN+l−1 = ci, which is in contradiction to ul = ci being unmatched in U(N). It follows that in this case in the transition
from W (N) to W (N+1), ci will be matched and exchanged with s j and W (N+1) = (u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1, c˜i, u˜l−1. . . . , u˜1), which
is
←−˜
u . The probability of this transition is 1.
We now check:
piU (u1, . . . ,ul−1, s˜ j,ul+1, . . . ,uL, c˜i)
piU (u1, . . . ,ul−1,ci,ul+1, . . . ,uL)
=
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
β s j,
P
(
U(N+1) = (u1, . . . ,ul−1, s˜ j,ul+1, . . . ,uL, c˜i) |U(N) = (u1, . . . ,ul−1,ci,ul+1, . . . ,uL)
)
P
(
W (N+1) = (u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1, c˜i, u˜l−1. . . . , u˜1) |W (N) = (ci, u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1,s j, u˜l−1. . . . , u˜1)
) = µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βs j .
Case (iv): x = s j, which can matched FCFS to u1 = ci.
In Cases (i)-(iii), the reversed transition was
←−˜
u
′→←−˜u with probability 1. In Case (iv) this is no longer so, and we
will need to calculate the probability of this transition.
Assume U(N) = u = (ci,u2, . . . ,ul−1,ci′ ,ul+1, . . . ,uL), where u2, . . . ,ul−1 contain no unmatched agents, and also
it does not contain any goods compatible with ci. Assume zN+1 = s j, and s j is compatible with u1 = ci. Then s j is
matched and exchanged with u1 (recall that u1 is always an unmatched agent). The resulting state then is U(N + 1) =
u′ = (ci′ ,ul+1, . . . ,uL, c˜i), because now zN+l−1 = ul = ci′ is the first unmatched agent. The probability of this transition
u→ u′ is µ¯λ¯+µ¯ β s j.
In that case W (N) =
←−˜
u′ = (ci, u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1, c˜i′). Because zN+1 = ci, it needs to be matched and exchanged in the
transition from W (N) to W (N + 1). By the same argument as for Case (iii), ci is not compatible with any unmatched
goods in u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1. We now consider the possibility that conditional on W (N) =
←−˜
u′ , the next transition will be
to the state W (N + 1) =
←−˜
u = (u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1, c˜i′ , u˜l−1, . . . , u˜2, c˜i). This will happen if and only if (zN+1, . . . ,zN+l−1) =
(u˜l−1, . . . , u˜2,s j). Denote by θ the probability of this event, then:
θ = P(W (N+1) =←−˜u |W (N) =←−˜u′ ) = P((zN+1, . . . ,zN+l−1) = (u˜l−1, . . . , u˜2,s j))
=
(
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)]agents( µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)]goods
∏
ci∈C
α]ci+]c˜ici ∏
s j∈S
β ]s j+]s˜ js j ×
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
β s j,
where we are counting the number of agents and of goods overall, and of each type separately, in u˜l−1, . . . , u˜2.
We now check:
piU (ci′ ,ul+1, . . . ,uL, c˜i)
piU (ci,u2, . . . ,ul−1,ci′ ,ul+1, . . . ,uL)
= θ−1
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
β s j,
P
(
U(N+1) = (ci′ ,ul+1, . . . ,uL, c˜i) |U(N) = (ci,u2, . . . ,ul−1,ci′ ,ul+1, . . . ,uL)
)
P
(
W (N+1) = (u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1, c˜i′ , u˜l−1, . . . , u˜2, c˜i) |W (N) = (ci, u˜L, . . . , u˜l+1, c˜i′)
) = θ−1 µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βs j .
The stationary distribution of the Markov chains U(N) and W (N) looks very simple: It seems to be the distribution
of a sequence of independent trials with outcomes in C ∪S with fixed probabilities, we call that a multi-Bernoulli
sequence. However, this simplicity is very deceptive: to say anything more about the distribution we need to know what
are the possible states that may occur, and we need to find a way to count them. The next theorem gives a characterization
of the valid states of U and W .
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Theorem 5 (Detailed State Cahracterization). A state U(N) = (u1, . . . ,uL) has a positive probability of occurring under
the stationary distribution if and only if it is /0, or it starts with an unmatched agent, it consists of elements ci, c˜i, s˜ j, and
for any k < l if uk = ci and ul = s˜ j then (s j,ci) 6∈ G .
Similarly, a state W (N) = (w1, . . . ,wL) has a positive probability of occurring under the stationary distribution if
and only if it is /0, or it ends with an exchanged agent, it consists of elements ci, c˜i,s j, and for any k > l if wk = c˜i and
wl = s j then (s j,ci) 6∈ G .
Proof. We prove the theorem for U . The result for W follows from the reversibility and Proposition 1.
The necessity is easy to see. By definition (u1, . . . ,uL) consists only of elements ci, c˜i, s˜ j. Assume to the contrary,
that for some k < l uk = ci and ul = s˜ j ∈S (ci). If ul = s˜ j then either zN+l−1 = s j and zN+l−1 remained unmatched and
was exchanged with itself, or zN+l−1 = ci′ and it was matched and exchanged with zN+m−1 = s j, for some l < m ≤ N.
But in either of these cases zN+k−1 = ci should have been matched and exchanged with s j, which is a contradiction.
More subtle is the proof that any (u1, . . . ,uL) that satisfies the conditions can occur with positive probability as U(N).
For such u = (u1, . . . ,uL), we construct u˜ = (u˜1, . . . , u˜L), and w as follows:
(i) Leave all unmatched elements um = ci in place, i.e. let u˜m = ci, this includes u˜1 since u1 is the first unmatched
agent.
(ii) Perform directed FCFS matching in reversed time on the elements c˜i and s˜ j in u, and exchange their places, so that
if uk = c˜i is matched with ul = s˜ j (where k > l) we let u˜k = s j and u˜l = ci.
(iii) Leave all the remaining elements um = s˜ j (if there are any) in place and exchange them, i.e. let u˜m = s j.
(iv) Consider the remaining elements um1 = c˜i1 , . . . ,umK = c˜iK (if there are any), where m1 < m2 · · ·< mK .
(v) For each umk = c˜ik let u˜mk = s jk where you choose s jk ∈S (cik).
(vi) Append (ci1 , . . . ,ciK ) to the constructed (u˜1, . . . , u˜L), to obtain w = ((ci1 , . . . ,ciK , u˜1, . . . , u˜L).
Note that all elements u˜l , l = 1, . . . ,L are well defined, and note that all elements of w are either ci ∈ C or s j ∈S .
Assume that U(N−K−L)= /0, and let zN−K−L+k =wk, k= 1, . . . ,L+K. It is important to note that there is a positive
probability for this event. We now claim that U(N) = u. We will go through the steps of moving from U(N−K−L) to
U(N), using directed FCFS, and matching and exchanging agent-good pairs.
We look first for matches for ci1 , . . . ,ciK . We start with ci1 , the first element of w, i.e. ci1 = z
N−K−L+1. We claim
that it will be matched and exchanged with u˜m1 = s j1 . By construction, (ci1 ,s j1) are compatible, and u˜m1 = z
N−L+m1
precedes all the other u˜mk in the sequence z
n. We need to show that if there is a u˜l = zN−L+l = s j, where l < m1, then it
must be incompatible with ci1 . Assume to the contrary that such u˜l = z
N−L+l = s j with l < m1 is compatible with ci1 .
We examine u˜l = s j. By construction of u˜, there are two possibilities: either for some l′ < l, ul′ = s˜ j was matched and
exchanges with ul = c˜i in step (ii) of the construction of u˜, or else ul = s˜ j was not matched in step (ii) and so was left in
place, as ul = s j in step (iii) of the construction. The two possibilities are illustrated in the following line:
1 l m1 L
u˜ = (u˜1, . . . s j, . . . , s j1 , . . . u˜L)
u = (u1, . . . s˜ j, . . . , c˜i1 , . . . uL)
,
1 l′ l m1 L
u˜ = (u˜1, . . . ci, . . . , s j, . . . , s j1 , . . . u˜L)
u = (u1, . . . s˜ j, . . . , c˜i, . . . , c˜i1 , . . . uL)
We now get a contradiction. Recall that we assume the um1 = c˜i1 was left unmatched in step (ii) and reached step (iv). If
ul = s˜ j was not exchanged in step (ii), then it would remain compatible with um1 = c˜i1 , and should have been matched
and exchanged with it in step (ii). If ul′ = s˜ j where l′ < l was matched and exchanged with ul = c˜i, in step (ii), then ul′
should have actually have been exchanged with um1 = c˜i1 and not with ul = c˜i.
We proceed by induction: if w1 = ci1 , . . . ,wk−1 = cik−1 have been matched and exchanged with u˜m1 = s j1 , . . . , u˜mk−1 =
s jk−1 , then wk = c˜ik cannot be matched to any of u˜m1 = s j1 , . . . , u˜mk−1 = s jk−1 , and by the same argument as for w1 it cannot
be matched to any u˜l = s j with l < mk. Hence it will be matched and exchanged with u˜mk = s jk .
We have then shown that by the time we reach U(N), the first remaining unmatched agent in u˜1 = u1, and all the
elements in positions m1, . . . ,mK are now occupied by c˜i1 , . . . , c˜iK . We note that in all the steps of the construction of u˜
we were converting s˜ j to s j, but never changing the types of these goods. By the assumption of the theorem, all ul = s˜ j
are of types incompatible with all unmatched uk = ci, if k < l. Therefore in step (i) all unmatched ul = ci will now be
u˜l = ci, and will remain unmatched in U(N). So U(N) coincides with u in positions m1, . . . ,mL, and in those positions
of u that had elements ci.
The remaining positions in u and u˜ are occupied by the agent-good pairs exchanged in step (ii) and the left over
goods of step (iii). We cIaim that if uk = c˜i and ul = s˜ j, k > l were exchanged to u˜l = ci and u˜k = s j in step (ii), then
in the directed FCFS matching leading to U(N), the agent u˜l = ci will be matched and exchanged with u˜k = s j back to
their original positions. Assume there is a u˜m = s j′ , such that l < m < k and (s j′ ,ci) ∈ G . If u˜m = s j′ resulted from an
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exchange with u˜m′ = ci′ , then we must have had l < m < k < m′, since step (ii) did matching in reversed FCFS, and so
u˜l = ci did not match with u˜m = s j′ . If u˜m = s j′ was obtained in step (iii) from um = s˜ j′ this would imply that it should
have matched in step (ii) with uk = c˜i, which is a contradiction. Hence we have the in U(N) all pairs exchanged from
their positions in u in step (ii), would be exchanged back to their original positions in U(N). All that remains are goods
remaining unmatched in step (iii) which will retain their positions in u as in u˜ and in U(N). This completes the proof
that U(N) = u.
4 A Concise Markov Chain, the Normalizing Constant, and a Sanity Check
The Markov chain U(N), and its reversal partner W (N), contain very detailed information about the evolution of
the directed FCFS matching. Much of this information is irrelevant, in particular the c˜ items and s˜ items in U(N)
refer to the past of the matching process, and have no influence on future matching. The only relevant part for the
future is the ordered list of unmatched agents, which is given by the Markov chain X(N), introduced in [2], where its
stationary distribution (Theorem 1, equation (4)) is obtained using a partial balance argument from [9]. We have briefly
summarized results on X(N) in Section 2. We note that the stationary distribution (4)) of X(N) can be obtained directly
from U(N). Later in this section (sub-section 4.1) we illustrate such a derivation using U(N).
The transitions of X(N) are very simple: given X(N) = (c1, . . . ,cL) and zN+1 the state X(N + 1) is determined
uniquely. On the other hand, the states are given by finite words of arbitrary length, which is awkward for calculations.
We next define a more concise Markov chain with simpler, finite dimensional states.
We define the Markov chain Y (N)N∈Z whose states are of the form Y (N) = y = (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk), where k ≤ I,
(C1, . . . ,Ck) is a permutation of C ⊆ C , and n j are positive integers. In pariticular, for k = 0 the state is denoted as
Y (N) = /0 or Y (N) = 0. The states of Y (N)N∈Z are derived from the states of X(N)N∈Z as follows: If X(N) = /0 then
also Y (N) = /0. If X(N) = (c1, . . . ,cL) then C1, . . . ,Ck are the types of agents appearing in x, in the order in which they
appear, and n j is the number of terms in x between the first appearance of C j and the first appearance of C j+1, for
j = 1, . . . ,k−1, and nk is the number of terms in x from the first appearance of Ck up to the last term cL. The number of
unmatched agents for Y (N) = (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk) is k+∑kj=1 n j. Note that now, given Y (N) and zN+1 we can determine
the next match, but the next state is not deterministic, several possible states Y (N+1) may result. This Markov chain is
similar to a Markov chain used in [12, 4].
Theorem 6. If the stability condition (2) holds then the stationary distribution of Y (N)N∈Z is given by:
piY (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk) = B
k
∏`
=1
λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})
(
λ{C1,...,C`}
µS ({C1,...,C`})
)n`
(12)
where B is a normalizing constant, which is also equal to the probability of a perfect match, i.e. piY ( /0) = B. The value
of B is given by (14).
Proof. We note that Y (N) = (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk) includes all states X(N) = (c1, . . . ,cL) where L = k+∑k`=1 n`, where
C`, ` = 1, . . . ,k appear at least once, in that order, and where between the appearance of C` and C`+1 there are any
combinations of n` agents of types C1, . . . ,C`, hence by (4):
piY (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk) = B
k
∏`
=1
λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})
 ∑
i1+···+i`=n`
n`!
i1! · · · i`!
`
∏
j=1
(
λC j
µS ({C1,...,C`})
)i j
= B
k
∏`
=1
λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})
(
λC1 + · · ·+λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})
)n`
We also get the probability of a perfect match, /0 from the balance equation:
piX (0) = piX (0)
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
+
I
∑
i=1
piX (ci)
µS (ci)
λ¯ + µ¯
piX (0)λ¯ =
I
∑
i=1
piX (ci)µS (ci) = B
I
∑
i=1
λci
µS (ci)
µS (ci) = Bλ¯ ,
so we get piX ( /0) = B, and from this also piY ( /0) = B.
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We also obtain the stationary probabilities of observing a state in which (C1, . . . ,Ck) appear for the first time in that
order, which we denote as (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·):
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) = B
k
∏`
=1
λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})
[
∞
∑
n`=0
(
λ{C1,...,C`}
µS ({C1,...,C`})
)n`]
= B
k
∏`
=1
λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})
µS ({C1,...,C`})
µS ({C1,...,C`})−λ{C1,...,C`}
(13)
= B
k
∏`
=1
λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})−λ{C1,...,C`}
Together with piY ( /0) = B, this gives us the stationary distribution of the unmatched types in X(N) or in U(N), in the
order in which they appear for the first time. These probabilities play a central role in the calculation of matching rates
(Section 5) and in deriving the distribution of delays (Section 6).
We now calculate the normalizing constant, B = piY (0). We need to sum over all subsets of C , and for each subset
C ⊆ C we need to sum over all the permutations of C, (altogeter the summation has f (I) = ∑Ik=0 I!(I−k)! terms, e.g.
f (0), f (1), . . . , f (10) = 1,2,5,16,65,326,1957,13700,109601,986410,9864101, we note that n!< f (n)< (n+1)!).
B =
(
I
∑
k=0
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∏`
=1
λC`
µS ({C1,...,C`})−λ{C1,...,C`}
)−1
(14)
where the term for k = 0 equals 1. We strongly suspect that calculation of B is ]-P complete (this is similar to the
conjecture that the normalizing constant in symmetric FCFS infinite bipartite matching is ]-P complete, made in [3]).
4.1 Deriving the expression for piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) directly from Theorems 4, 5.
We first calculate piY (C1, ·), by summing piU (u) over all admissible u that contain only unmatched agents of type C1.
A typical state of this form will be:
u = (C1, . . . , c˜, c˜, . . . ,s j ∈S (C1), . . . , c˜, c˜, . . . , . . .C1, . . . , . . .C1, . . . , c˜, c˜, . . . ,s j ∈S (C1), . . . , c˜, c˜, . . .)
where c˜ can be any exchanged agents, s j must all be goods incompatible with C1, and there are n ≥ 1 C1s, with m ≥ 0
s j ∈S (C1) following each C1, and k ≥ 0 c˜s following each C1 or s j.
We therefore get by the expression (9) for piU (u):
piY (C1, ·) = B
∞
∑
n=1
{
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
αC1
(
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)[ ∞∑
m=0
(
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βS (C1)
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)m]}n
= B
∞
∑
n=1
 λ¯λ¯ + µ¯ αC1 11− λ¯λ¯+µ¯
∞
∑
m=0
 µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βS (C1)
1
1− λ¯λ¯+µ¯
m
n
= B
∞
∑
n=1
{
λ¯
µ¯
αC1
∞
∑
m=0
(
1−βS (C1)
)m}n
= B
∞
∑
n=1
{
λ¯
µ¯
αC1
βS (C1)
}n
= B
∞
∑
n=1
{
λC1
µS (C1)
}n
= B
λC1
µS (C1)−λC1
Next we calculate piY (C1, ·,C2, ·). We need to sum probabilities of typical states of the form:
u = (C1, . . . ,C2, . . . ,s j ∈S (C1,C2), . . . ,ci ∈ {C1,C2}, . . . ,
where the first part up to the first C2 is as a typical (C1·) state, followed by the first C2 and then any number of c˜, and
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any number of ci ∈ {C1,C2} and s j ∈S (C1,C2), and we then get:
piY (C1, ·,C2, ·) = B
∞
∑
n=1
{
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
αC1
(
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)[ ∞∑
m=0
(
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βS (C1)
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)m]}n
× λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
αC2
(
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)[ ∞∑
m=0
(
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βS ({C1,C2})
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)m]
×
∞
∑
n=0
{
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
α{C1,C2}
(
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)[ ∞∑
m=0
(
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βS ({C1,C2})
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)m]}n
= B
λC1
µS (C1)−λC1
× λC2
µS ({C1,C2})
×
∞
∑
n=0
{
λ{C1,C2}
µS ({C1,C2})
}n
= B
λC1
µS (C1)−λC1
λC2
µS ({C1,C2})−λ{C1,C2}
.
Finally we proceed by induction, to obtain, using the same steps in the derivation:
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,CL, ·) = B
L−1
∏
l=1
λCl
µS ({C1,...,Cl})−λ{C1,...,Cl}
× λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
αCL
(
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)[ ∞∑
m=0
(
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βS ({C1,...,CL})
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)m]
×
∞
∑
n=0
{
λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
α{C1,...,CL}
(
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)[ ∞∑
m=0
(
µ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
βS ({C1,...,CL})
∞
∑
k=0
( λ¯
λ¯ + µ¯
)k)m]}n
= B
L
∏
l=1
λCl
µS ({C1,...,Cl})−λ{C1,...,Cl}
5 Calculation of the Matching Rates
Definition 4 (Matching Rates). In a stable FCFS directed bipartite matching we define matching rates as follows: rs j ,ci
is the fraction of matches which are of goods type s j and agent type ci, and rs j , /0 is the fraction of goods which are of
type s j and are not matched.
To make things clear, ∑s j∈S
(
rs j , /0+∑ci∈C rs j ,ci
)
= 1. we also have:
- For goods of type s j, the fraction that will remain unmatched, and the fraction that will be matched with agents of
type ci is given by:
ηs j( /0) =
rs j , /0(
rs j , /0+∑ci∈C rs j ,ci
) , ηs j(ci) = rs j ,ci(
rs j , /0+∑ci∈C rs j ,ci
) .
- For agents of type ci, the fraction that will be matched with goods of type s j is given by:
θci(s j) =
rs j ,ci
∑s j∈S rs j ,ci
The total fraction of unmatched goods is, by considering total rates of all agents and goods:
r /0 = ∑
s j∈S
µs j
µ¯
ηs j , /0 =
µ¯− λ¯
µ¯
Theorem 7. In a stable system the matching rates for (s j,ci) ∈ G are given by:
rs j ,ci =
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) (15)
×
(
1(C1 = ci)∨1({C1}∩C (s j) = /0∧C2 = ci)∨·· ·1({C1, . . . ,Ck−1}∩C (s j) = /0∧Ck = ci)
)
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The rates of unmatched goods are given by:
rs j , /0 =
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) (16)
×
(
1({C1, . . . ,Ck}∩C (s j) = /0)
)
(17)
Proof. We consider the stationary version of Y (N). By discrete time version of PASTA, at the moment that zN+1 ∈S
the state at time N is the stationary state of the process. We wish to find for every zN+1 ∈S what match it will find, or
remain unmatched, and calculate the probability of each outcome. These probabilities will be the matching rates.
Assume zN+1 = s j, then the type of match for for zN+1 is determined unequivocally by the state C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·. In
particular the match will be with ci if and only if for some 1≤ l ≤ k, Cl = ci, and all of C1, . . . ,Cl−1 are not compatible
with s j. If all of C1, . . . ,Ck are incompatible with s j, then zN+1 will remain unmatched.
Hence to obtain rs j ,ci we need to add up all the stationary probabilities of states (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) for which s j will
match with ci, and multiply this sum by
µs j
µ¯ , which is P(zN+1 = s j |zN+1 ∈S ). Similarly for rs j , /0 we add the probabilities
for (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) for which s j remains unmatched and multiply by
µs j
µ¯ .
As already stated in several previous papers, it is very likely that the calculation of B is ]-P complete. Calculation
of B directly from (14) requires adding up ∑ j j!
(n
j
)
terms, which is still quite feasible for small |C | = I. We note that
the terms added to calculate B are also the terms needed to add for calculating the matching rates. We formulate the
following algorithm for calculation of the matching rates:
algorithm 1: Calculation of normalizing constant and matching rates
1. Initialize: B := 1; rs j ,ci := 0;
2. For A⊆ C , A 6= /0:
For (C1, . . . ,C|A|) ∈ Permutations(A):
3. X = 1; Cset := /0; Sset := /0; λset := 0; µset := 0; Match(s j) := /0.
4. For l = 1, |A|:
5. Cset :=Cset ∪Cl ; ∆Sset :=S (Cl)\Sset ; Sset := Sset ∪S (Cl);
λ = λCl ; λset := λset +λ ; µset := µset +µ∆Sset ;
Rl := 1µset−λset ; X := XλRl .
6. B := B+X .
7. For l = 1, |A|:
For s j ∈S :
8. If Cl ∈ C (s j)∧Match(s j) = /0 then:
Match(s j) :=Cl ; rs j ,Cl := rs j ,Cl +X .
9. B := 1/B; rs j ,ci := B
µs j
µ¯ rs j ,ci ; rs j , /0 :=
µs j
µ¯ −∑ci∈C rs j ,ci .
We explain the algorithm here: Line 1 is initialization. Lines 2–8 are a loop over all subsets of agent types, and per-
mutations of the subsets. Within this loop, for each C1, . . . ,Ck, there are two internal loops: lines 3–5 contain a loop over
Cl , for the calculation of the ratios,
λCl
µS (C1 ,...,Cl )−λC1 ,...,Cl
, and their successive products to obtain X ∝ piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·),
then line 6 accumulates the calculated values of X ; the second loop, lines 7–8, is over all Cl and s j ∈S , it uses the value
X , and accumulates it to rs j ,ci if Y (N) = (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) and ZN+1 = s j results in an (s j,cl) match. Line 9 completes the
calculation of the normalizing constant and matching rates.
6 The Distribution and the Moments of Delays
Definition 5 (Delays). If zm = ci is matched to zn = s j, the we define the (s j,ci) delay between them as Ls j ,ci = n−m. If
zm = ci is matched to zn ∈S we define the delay of ci by Lci = n−m.
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In this section we obtain the distribution of the delays. It turns out that this distribution is a mixture of convolutions
of geometric random variables. We will derive expressions for its generating function, and based on the simple form
of the distribution we also obtain expressions for its moments. We will also translate the delays to waiting times, if
the arrivals of all types form independent Poisson processes. To calculate the delay we need the following result that
complements Theorems 4, 5.
Theorem 8. Consider the process U(N), and assume that the corresponding Y (N)= (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·). Dente by Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck)
the number of items in U(N), From the first appearance of Cl to the first appearance of Cl+1, l = 1, . . . ,k−1 and from
the first appearance of Ck to the end, i.e. if U(N) = u= (u1, . . . ,uL), and uml =Cl , uml+1 =Cl+1 are the first appearances
of agent types Cl ,Cl+1 in u, then Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck) = ml+1−ml , l = 1, . . . ,k− 1, and Dk(C1, . . . ,Ck) = L+ 1−mk. The
distribution of Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck) is a Geometric distribution over m = 1,2, . . ., given by:
P(Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck) = m) =
µS ({C1,...,Cl})−λ{C1,...,Cl}
λ¯ + µ¯
(
1− µS ({C1,...,Cl})−λ{C1,...,Cl}
λ¯ + µ¯
)m−1
. (18)
Furthermore, Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck), l = 1, . . . ,k are independent.
Proof. Note that by the condition (2), for a stable system, 0 <
µS ({C1 ,...,Cl})−λ{C1 ,...,Cl}
λ¯+µ¯ < 1. We fix C1, . . . ,Ck, and for
notational convenience use Dl to denote Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck). We calculate the probability of the states of U(N), with
(
m1︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1, · · ·,
m2︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2, · · ·, . . . ,
mk︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ck, · · ·) where we sum up over all possible values of each of the ml−1 items in the interval between
the first appearance of Cl and the first appearance of Cl+1, i.e. we will calculate: P(D1 = m1, . . . ,Dk = mk ∩Y =
C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·).
To do that we calculate first:
P(D1 = m1+1∩Y =C1, ·)
P(D1 = m1∩Y =C1, ·) =
P(
m1+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1, · · ·)
P(
m1︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1, · · ·)
= ∑
u∈{C1,S (C1),c˜i,i=1,...,I}
P(
m1︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1, · · ·,u)
P(
m1︷ ︸︸ ︷
C1, · · ·)
=
1
λ¯ + µ¯
(
λC1 +µS (C1)+ λ¯
)
= 1− µS (C1)−λC1
λ¯ + µ¯
From which we obtain:
P(D1 = m1∩Y =C1, ·) = λC1λ¯ + µ¯
(
1− µS (C1)−λC1
λ¯ + µ¯
)m1−1
.
Proceeding in the same way for D2, . . . ,Dk we obtain that
P(D1 = m1, . . . ,Dk = mk ∩C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) =
k
∏
l=1
λCl
λ¯ + µ¯
(
1− µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
λ¯ + µ¯
)ml−1
Dividing by piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) given in equation (13) we obtain
P
(
D1 = m1, . . . ,Dk = mk
∣∣Y (N) = (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·))
=
k
∏
l=1
µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
λ¯ + µ¯
(
1− µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
λ¯ + µ¯
)ml−1
Which is what we needed to show.
By definition, if Y (N) = (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·), with Cl = ci, and zN+1 = s j, so that s j matches with Cl (i.e. s j 6∈
S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1) and s j ∈S (Cl)), then
Ls j ,ci =
k
∑
h=l
Dh(C1, . . . ,Ck)
and this will happen with probability piY ((C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·)
µs j
µ¯ . We obtain directly:
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Theorem 9. The delays Ls j ,ci and of Lci are distributed as mixtures of convolutions of geometric random variables:
Ls j ,ci =
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∑
l=1
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·)
×1((Cl = ci)∧ (s j 6∈S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1)))× k∑
h=l
Dh(C1, . . . ,Ck) (19)
Lci = ∑
s j∈S (ci)
rs j ,ci
∑sh∈S (ci) rsh,ci
Ls j ,ci(Z). (20)
Proof. For Ls j ,ci we add up the values conditional of Y = (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·), for all Y for which there is an (s j,ci) match,
multiplied by the probability piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) and the probability of s j which is
µs j
µ¯ , and divide by the sum of these
probabilities which is rs j ,ci . Lci is an average of the Ls j ,ci , weighted by rs j ,ci .
Corollary 1. The generating function of Ls j ,ci is given by:
Gs j ,ci(Z) =
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∑
l=1
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) (21)
×1((Cl = ci)∧ (s j 6∈S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1)))× k∏
h=l
Z
µS (C1 ,...,Cl )−λC1 ,...,Cl
λ¯+µ¯
1−Z
(
1− µS (C1 ,...,Cl )−λC1 ,...,Clλ¯+µ¯
) ,
with mean and variance:
E(Ls j ,ci) =
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∑
l=1
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) (22)
×1((Cl = ci)∧ (s j 6∈S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1)))× k∑
h=l
(µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
λ¯ + µ¯
)−1
,
Var(Ls j ,ci) =
{ 1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∑
l=1
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·)
×1((Cl = ci)∧ (s j 6∈S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1))) (23)
×
 k∑h=l
(
1− µS (C1 ,...,Cl )−λC1 ,...,Clλ¯+µ¯
)
(
µS (C1 ,...,Cl )−λC1 ,...,Cl
λ¯+µ¯
)2 +
(
k
∑
h=l
(µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
λ¯ + µ¯
)−1)2}
−E(Ls j ,ci)2
The mean and variance of Lci can be obtained from these directly.
Proof. this follows from properties of Geometric random variables:
X ∼ Geometric(p), P(X = n) = p(1− p)n−1, n = 1,2, . . . ,
GX (Z) = E(ZX ) =
Zp
1−Z(1− p) , E(X) = p
−1, Var(X) =
1− p
p2
.
Conditional on Y = (C1, . . . ,Ck), the delay Ls j ,ci is a sum of independent geometric random variables, with mean and
variance that are the sums of the means and variances of the geometric random variables. The unconditional mean
follows directly. The unconditional variance is the expectation of the conditional variances plus the variance of the
conditional means.
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Calculation of means and variances of the delays is similar to the calculation of the matching raters. We provide here
an algorithm for these calculations. It follows the steps of Algorithm 1, and only requires addition of some calculations
to line 8, and additional line 10.
algorithm 2: Calculation of means and variances of delays
1a Initialize: XEs j ,ci := 0; XE
2
s j ,ci := 0; XVs j ,ci := 0.
...
8a If Cl ∈ C (s j)∧Match(s j) = /0 then:
Match(s j) :=Cl ; rs j ,Cl := rs j ,Cl +X .
AE := 0; AV := 0.
8b For h = l, |A|:
Ph = 1/[(λ¯ + µ¯)Rh];
AE := AE +1/Ph, AV := AV +(1−Ph)/Ph2.
8c Es j ,Cl := Es j ,Cl +X AE; E
2
s j ,Cl
:= E2s j ,Cl +X AE
2; Vs j ,Cl :=Vs j ,Cl +X AV .
...
9a E(Ls j ,ci) := B
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯ Es j ,ci ; E
2
s j ,Ci := B
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯ E
2
s j ,Ci ; Vs j ,Ci := B
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯ Vs j ,Ci .
Var(Ls j ,ci) :=Vs j ,Cl +E
2
s j ,Ci −E(Ls j ,ci)2.
We explain the algorithm: inside the loop of line 8, for (C1, . . . ,Ck) we locate matches (s j,Cl) in the If state-
ment, and then calculate the sum from l to k of the conditional mean and variance of Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck), multiplied by
X ∝ piY (C1, . . . ,Ck). We accumulate these over all (C1, . . . ,Ck), to calculate the unconditional mean of the conditional
variances, and the unconditional variance of the conditional means, leading to the means and variances in line 9a.
Delays can be translated to waiting times. Assume arrivals of agents and goods are independent Poisson processes,
with rates λci , µs j , if zm = ci is matched to zn = s j, then we denote the (s j,ci) wait between them as Ws j ,ci , which is the
sum of n−m exponential random variables, with rate parameter λ¯µ¯ . If zm = ci is matched to zn ∈S we denote the wait
of zm by Wci , ditto. We then have:
Corollary 2 (Waiting Times). Under Poisson assumption the waiting times are distributed as mixtures of convolutions
of independent exponential random variables. The moment generating function of Ws j ,ci is given by:
Ms j ,ci(s) =
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∑
l=1
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) (24)
×1((Cl = ci)∧ (s j 6∈S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1)))× k∏
h=l
µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl − s
with mean and variance:
E(Ws j ,ci) =
1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∑
l=1
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·) (25)
×1((Cl = ci)∧ (s j 6∈S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1)))× k∑
h=l
1
µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
,
Var(Ws j ,ci) =
{ 1
rs j ,ci
µs j
µ¯
I
∑
k=1
∑
C⊆C , |C|=k
∑
(C1,...,Ck)∈P(C)
k
∑
l=1
piY (C1, ·, . . . ,Ck, ·)
×1((Cl = ci)∧ (s j 6∈S (C1, . . . ,Cl−1))) (26)
×
 k∑
h=l
1
(µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl )2
+
(
k
∑
h=l
1
µS (C1,...,Cl)−λC1,...,Cl
)2}−E(Ws j ,ci)2
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The mean and variance of Wci can be obtained from these directly.
Proof. Recall that if U ∼ Exp(θ) then its moment generating function is MU (s) = θθ−s , it mean is E(U) = 1θ and its
variance is Var(U) = 1θ2 .
If Ui ∼ Exp(θ) i.i.d., and Y ∼ Geom(p) then V = ∑Yi=1 Ui ∼ Exp(θ p). Hence, each Dl(C1, . . . ,Ck) contributes an
exponential wait with rate parameter µS (C1,...,Ck)−λC1,...,Ck .
7 Light and Heavy Traffic, Relation to Symmetric FCFS Matching
In this section we consider our system when the overall traffic intensity, given by λ¯/µ¯ is close to 0, i.e. the system is
in light traffic, or close to and below 1, i.e. the system is in heavy traffic. We wish to obtain the limiting matching rates
under these conditions.
For light traffic we have:
Proposition 3. If λ¯/µ¯ → 0, then for (s j,ci) ∈ G , rs j ,ci → αci
µs j
∑sk∈S (ci) µsk
Proof. If λ¯/µ¯ → 0 then for agent zN = ci, with high probability there will be no earlier unmatched agents prior to ZN ,
i.e. X(N) = /0, and zN will be followed by a large number of goods of all types. zN will then match with the first good
with which it is compatible, and this good will be of type s j with probability
µs j
∑sk∈S (ci) µsk
. To obtain rs j ,ci this needs to
be multiplied by αci .
We next define a property which ensures stability for all 0< λ¯/µ¯ < 1.
Definition 6 (Complete Resource Pooling). For given compatibility graph G and frequency vectors α , β , we say that
the system has complete resource pooling (CRP) if the following three equivalent conditions hold for all subsets C⊂ C ,
C 6= /0,C , and S⊂S , S 6= /0,S :
αC < βS (C), βS < αC (S), αU (S) < βS. (27)
This condition is also the necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the symmetric FCFS bipartite matching
model of [7, 3, 1]. By Theorem 2, CRP implies that our system is stable for all 0< λ¯/µ¯ < 1. If CRP does not hold, then
the system will be stable if and only if
0< λ¯/µ¯ < min
C 6= /0,C
βS (C)
αC
.
As we shall see in the next theorem, in heavy traffic our model behaves more and more like the symmetric FCFS
bipartite matching model of [7, 3, 1]. For clarity we will denote quantities relating to our directed FCFS matching model
by ·D, and quantities relating to the symmetric FCFS bipartite matching model by ·B
It was noted in Moyal, Busic and Mairesse [11] that in a FCFS matching model with a single sequence of arrivals
of both agents and goods, if agents as well as goods are allowed to wait until they find a match the system can never be
stable, even if the data satisfies the property of CRP, since the total number of agents minus the total number of goods in
the sequence starting from empty, behaves like an unconstrained one dimensional random walk, which is always either
transient if CRP does not hold, or null recurrent if CRP holds. Therefore the number of unmatched agents or goods
diverges in the sense that if we define:
∆(N) = absolute difference between number of unmatched agents and unmatched goods by time N, then P(∆(N) >
n)→ 1 as N→ ∞.
However, in the symmetric FCFS matching model of [7, 3, 1] there are two sequences, one only of agents and one
only of goods. Starting from empty, by time N the number of agent arrivals equals the number of goods arrivals, and if
CRP holds then the system is stable, and the number of unmatched agents or goods converges to a stationary distribution.
For our system we defined the Markov processes XD(N) = (c1,c2, . . . ,cL) that lists all unmatched agents at time N
(Section 2). For the symmetric FCFS matching model in [1] we define the Markov process XB(N) = (c1,c2, . . . ,cL)
which list unmatched agents after all goods up to N have been matched to agents earlier or later than N, and we include
in this list all the unmatched agents starting from the first unmatched agent, and continuing until at least one type of
agent is included in the list. This process is a slight modification of the so called ’natural’ process defined and studied
in Section 5.5 of [1]). The stationary distribution of XD(N) was given in (12). The stationary distribution of XB(N) can
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be derived in the same way that the stationary distribution of the ’natural’ process in [1] is derived. These stationary
distributions are:
piDX (c1, . . . ,cL) ∝
(
λ¯
µ¯
)L
∏L`=1
αc`
β
S ({c1 ,...,c`})
piDX (c1, . . . ,cL) ∝∏
L
`=1
αc`
β
S ({c1 ,...,c`})
(28)
We also defined the Markov process Y D(N) = (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk) (Section 4). We define similarly the process Y B(N) =
(C1,n1, . . . ,CI−1,nI−1,CI) which is obtained from XB(N) by listing the types of agents in their order of appearance, and
counting the number of unmatched agents between each pair. Note that CI is determined as the one type not included in
C1, . . . ,CI−1, and it is followed by the infinite sequence of agents of all types not yet matched. The stationary distribution
of Y B(N) is derived similar to the derivation of the stationary distribution of Y D(N) in Theorem 6. We have:
piDY (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk) ∝∏
k
`=1
(
λ¯
µ¯
αC`
βS ({C1 ,...,C`})
)(
λ¯
µ¯
α{C1 ,...,C`}
βS ({C1 ,...,C`})
)n`
piDY (C1,n1, . . . ,CI−1,nI−1,CI) ∝ αCI ∏
I−1
`=1
αC`
βS ({C1 ,...,C`})
(
α{C1 ,...,C`}
βS ({C1 ,...,C`})
)n` (29)
Theorem 10. Assume CRP holds. When λ¯µ¯ ↗ 1 the following holds for the stationary distribution of Y D(N):
(i) The probability that in Y D(N) = (C1,n1, . . . ,Ck,nk) with k < I converges to 0.
(ii) The probability that Y D(N) = (C1,n1, . . . ,CI ,nI) and nI is less than any constant goes to 0.
(iii) Conditional on k = I,nI > 0, the process Y D0 (N) = (C1,n1, . . . ,CI), obtained from Y
D(N) by deleting nI from the
state, is a Markov process.
(iv) The stationary distribution and the transition probabilities of Y D0 (N) converge to the stationary distribution and
the transition probabilities of Y B(N) in total variation distance.
Proof. (i) We note that
α{C1 ,...,CI}
βS ({C1 ,...,CI})
= 1. By Theorem 8 all the ni have geometric distributions. For l < I we have by
CRP
λ¯
µ¯
α{C1,...,C`}
βS ({C1,...,C`})
<
α{C1,...,C`}
βS ({C1,...,C`})
≤max
C⊂C
αC
βS (C)
= κ < 1.
while for k = I we have λ¯µ¯
λ¯
µ¯
α{C1 ,...,C`}
βS ({C1 ,...,C`})
= λ¯µ¯ ↗ 1. It follows that most of the sum of terms needed to compute the
normalizing constant B is concentrated in the terms for which k = I.
(ii) When k = I then nI is distributed as a geometric random variable and so the probability that nI is less than any
constant M is 1−
(
λ¯
µ¯
)M ↘ 0.
(iii) If k = I and ni >> 0, the possible transitions from Y D(N) are: if zN+1 = ci it augments ni. Otherwise, if
zN+1 = s j it will match with one of C1, . . . ,CI , say Cl , and as a result the order of C1, . . . ,CI and number of unmatched
agents between them will change. At worst, Cl appears only once, in which case it become the new CI and nI decreases
by a geometric number of terms. We do not need the information on nI except to know it is positive enough.
(iv) It is seen immediately that piY D0 (C1,n1, . . . ,CI)→ piY B(C1,n1, . . . ,CI). The description of the transitions in part
(iii) shows also that the conditional transitions of piY D0 when nI >> 0 are the same as those of Y
B.
It follows immediately that:
Corollary 3. Assume CRP holds. When λ¯µ¯ ↗ 1 the matching rates of the directed FCFS bipartite matching model
converge to the matching rates of the symmetric FCFS bipartite matching model, while the fraction of unassigned goods
converges to 0.
8 A Simple Illustrative Example
We consider a simple system, with three types of agents and three types of goods and G = {(s1,c1),(s1,c2),(s2,c1),(s2,c3),(s3,c2),(s3,c3)},
with α = (.3, .5, .2), β = (.3, .3, .4), as illustrated in Fig 1. With the help of Algorithms 1 and 2 we can calculate match-
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Figure 1: A 3x3 system
ing rates and means and variances of delays. For µ¯ = 1, λ¯ = 0.7 and ρ = λ¯/µ¯ = 0.7 we obtain:
rs j ,ci =
c1 c2 c3
s1 0.090 0.139 0
s2 0.120 0 0.067
s3 0 0.211 0.073
, rs j , /0 =
lost
s1 0.071
s2 0.113
s3 0.116
,
E(Ls j ,ci) =
c1 c2 c3
s1 7.63 7.64 0
s2 7.14 0 6.38
s3 0 7.40 6.45
, σ(Ls j ,ci) =
c1 c2 c3
s1 6.14 6.30 0
s2 5.97 0 5.41
s3 0 6.21 5.46
.
From this calculation we see that the loss probabilities for the various goods may be quite different. We also obtain for
the delays of the various type of agents:
E(Lc1) = 7.35, E(Lc2) = 7.50, E(Lc3) = 6.38,
σ((Lc1) = 6.05, σ((Lc2) = 6.25, σ((Lc3) = 5.44.
Assume now that arrivals are Poisson, with rates λ¯ , µ¯ , then using Corollary 2 we have:
E(Wc1) = 4.33, E(Wc2) = 4.41, E(Wc3) = 3.75.
σ((Wc1) = 3.90, σ((Wc2) = 4.01, σ((Wc3) = 3.53.
We can see from these results that the FCFS matching policy achieve balanced supply of goods, the expected delays for
the three types of agents are very close to each other, and even the expected delays for individual (s j,ci) ∈ G are quite
close. We also see that the standard deviation of delays is close to the expectation, which indicates that the distribution
of delays and waiting times is close to exponential.
By Proposition 3 and Theorem 10 we know the limits of the matching rates as ρ = λ¯/µ¯ approaches 0 or 1. Fig 2
shows how the matching rates for (s j,ci) ∈ G vary as 0< ρ < 1. We see that the variations in values of match rates are
not very large. In very light traffic each agent receives goods immediately, and is not influenced by the agents of the
other types, so the matching rates are as if each type of agent has its own set of goods without sharing. In heavy traffic
there is CRP and sharing of all the resources of the goods. The change over the range of values of ρ is monotone. For a
possible explanation of how the rates change consider agent type c2. In light traffic it receives 37 from s1 and
4
7 from s3.
In heavy traffic, goods of types s1 are shared with c1, and goods of types s3 are shared with c3, but the requirements of
c1 are 0.3 and those of c3 are only 0.2, so more goods of type s3 then of type s1 are diverted to c2, and so rs1,c2 decreases,
and rs3,c2 increases with ρ .
It is perhaps worthwhile to compare the bipartite matching of this example to what would be the results of elim-
inating the pooling effect. Assume each type of agent is matched with only one type of good, as follows: G1 =
{(s1,c1),(s2,c3),(s3,c2)} (these edges are marked by heavier lines in Fig 1). In Fig 3 we plot the average waiting
times for each type of agent, for our system under the pooled bipartite matching, compared with the waiting times for
discriminating matching according to G1. Under discriminating matching each agent-good pair behaves like an M/M/1
queue with expected waiting time 1µs j−λci
. We see that the pair (s3,c2) becomes unstable for ρ > 0.8, the pair (s2,c3)
has discriminating traffic intensity < 23 but pooled waiting time is still shorter than discriminating for all ρ < 0.8. For
the pair (s1,c1), where discriminating traffic intensity varies form 0 to 1, the ratio of waiting times starts at ≈ 2 in light
traffic and converges to ≈ 3.3 as ρ ↗ 1. This is slightly better than the ratio we expect from pooling 3 i.i.d. M/M/1
queues.
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Figure 2: Plots of the matching rates as a function of traffic intensity
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